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Theoretical practices that work: those that mimic Nature’s own 
Nancy Cartwright1 
UCSD and Durham University 
 
1. The problem. If the topic is realism about scientific theories, particularly highly abstract, general 
theories, what might the question be? It is, I shall argue, unfair to suppose that theories of this kind 
make claims since any way of rendering their equations and principle as propositions either makes 
them false or undersells their usefulness. So the question should not be ‘Are the theory’s claims 
true.’ Instead I propose: ‘What image of the world makes intelligible the successes and failures of 
our theoretic practices?’ The answer I propose: Nature does it just like us. Our successful theoretical 
practices work well for predicting and manipulating the world because they mimic Nature’s own 
practices.  
I have always been a kind of Wittgensteinian Tractarian about the world; an instrumentalist about 
high-level theories of it;2 and an empiricist – a prudent empiricist –  when it comes to warrant. As to 
theory: It is best seen as a tool we use to produce descriptions of what happens in concrete 
situations. As to the world: There are just the facts, which involve concrete things, features, 
relations, processes, powers, and happenings. Possibilities are real but they depend entirely on the 
facts and on how Nature brings them about, and Nature, I suggest, brings them about in the same 
way that we predict them. As to warrant: Claims about the empirical world are warranted by the 
facts; and when two sets of hypotheses are supported by the same facts, the less bold is the better 
warranted. 
We use our theories to build models of concrete systems for prediction, manipulation, and 
explanation, all of which, when the model is successful, involve well-warranted propositions.3 The 
(usually complicated) propositions that describe the world as the model models it use irreducibly 
‘theoretical’ concepts. For example, any detailed description of what happens when a laser emits a 
beam of coherent light will refer to electrons, photons, quantum energy, and excited states, and at 
some stage should employ some version of Schroedinger’s equation. That secures an image of the 
world replete with many of the quantities, kinds, qualities, and processes named by our theoretical 
concepts.  
This makes trouble for instrumentalism. It does not seem that theory can be just an instrument, like 
a barometer or a pocket calculator. These theoretical terms are meaningful, with considerable 
evidence that they refer; and the equations play a role as equations in constructing our best 
descriptions of the facts. Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism provides a ‘middle’ way to finesse 
this problem: read the claims of theory literally but you need not count them true; the theory is 
acceptable just in case its empirical consequences are correct.  
                                                          
1
 It will be obvious how much my thinking owes to Bas van Fraassen and Hasok Chang; for concern with details, 
to Pat Suppes; for finding the possible in the actual, to Ruth Marcus; and for the toolbox of science, to my co-
authors Towfic Shomar and Mauricio Suarez. (For this last see Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Suarez, M. 
(1995). ‘The Tool Box of Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example’. In W.E. 
Herfel, W. Krajewski, I. Niiniluoto, R. Wojcicki, R., (Eds.), Theories and Models in Scientific Processes. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi.)  
2
 At least in the disciplines I have studied. 
3
 How the Laws of Physics Lie called these ‘phenomenological models’. (See Cartwright, N. (1983). How the 
Laws of Physics Lie. New York: Oxford University Press. Reproduced in Oxford Scholarship on Line (2003).)  
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That, I urged long ago with arguments that I still endorse, will not do. First note that what we call the 
‘principles’ of a theory are seldom propositions. In the mathematical sciences they are frequently 
equations; in the non-mathematical, sentences without scope indicators.4 Despite decades of efforts 
(see below), I have never found a way to render them as propositions so that the principles of our 
best theories turn out well warranted. My current view is the same, after all this effort, as at the 
start. These theories will not prove acceptable by realist standards nor by the standards of 
constructive empiricism. That’s because theories, if taken literally, do not get their empirical 
consequences right, for three reasons: 
a. Theoretical equations are usually turned into propositions by adding universal 
quantifiers.5 But we have evidence against this universalism – myriads of cases where we 
cannot get the equations to fit the measured values.  Universalists explain by saying there 
must be factors present that aren’t represented; were they represented, the equations 
would hold. This is a bold conjecture. An alternative explanation is that the equations just 
don’t fit those cases. 
b. In a great many cases where the equations are used to describe what happens, they are 
amended from their original form by ‘correction factors’. They don’t literally describe what 
happens, they only begin to do so. 
c. Much of science works by the analytic method: We pair representations of separate parts 
with rules of combination6 to calculate what happens when the parts are arranged together. 
How are we to turn the representations for the parts into true propositions? The familiar 
case is forces. The law of gravity becomes ‘(x)(y) F(y)  = GM(x)m(y)/rxy
2‘; Coulomb’s principle, 
‘(x)(y) F(y) = ϵ0q1(x)q2(y)/rxy 
2. For some systems y that have both mass and charge, F(y) = 0. 
So these propositions are not true.7 
These constitute specific reasons that these high-level theoretical principles rendered as claims in 
the canonical way are not warranted: They don’t have the right relationship to more ‘low-level’ 
claims about concrete situations that are well-warranted for warrant to flow up to them. Yet they do 
not seem mere instruments to construct descriptions of concrete behaviours in which their form and 
content are completely invisible, like ‘F(y) = 0 in this setting’ and ‘Q-switching in this laser produces 
pulse durations on the order of nanoseconds’.  So here is the task for scientific realism as I 
reconstruct it: To identify theoretical claims that are both well-warranted and that preserve 
something of the form and content of the theory’s principles. The key to accomplish this is to give far 
more central prominence to theoretical practices. 
2. Realist proposal.  With theoretical practice center stage, if we want to find some well-warranted 
claims that resemble the equations and principles we write in our theories, I propose that we take 
seriously what we say when we use these theoretical principles in situ.  This will secure an open-
ended set of true situation-specific theoretical claims in which our theoretical principles appear 
much as we represent them. Here’s a simple illustration, a situation-specific claim in which the 
                                                          
4
 As for instance in ‘[S]treaming…costs very little, improves test scores, and is therefore extremely cost-
effective.’ From the J-PAL website: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/policy-lessons/education/increasing-
test-score-performance 
5
 For example, ‘∇ × 𝐄 =  − ∂𝐁/ ∂t’ becomes ‘For all systems x, ∇ × 𝐄(x) =  − ∂𝐁(x)/ ∂t’. 
6
 Often an open-ended set of ‘rules of thumb’ that get adjusted in different ways in practical application, unlike 
the fixed and explicit rule of vector addition for forces. 
7
 This is in stark contrast with the simultaneous equations models of economics where each and every 
equation must be true at once. 
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functional form of Coulomb’s principle appears explicitly: ‘If in this setting, charge q1 is added this 
way here, charge q2 located r away from it will experience an additional force ϵ0q1q2/r
2‘. Though this 
claim sounds almost identical to Coulomb’s principle, it is situation-specific. It would not be true for 
instance if q1 is introduced in the middle of a Faraday cage.
8 I’ll expand on this in section 5. Before 
that I shall explain how my more direct attempts to turn these principles into credibly true 
propositions have failed. This takes us on a detour through powers, which is one way of arriving at 
my overall conclusion. But if you don’t like powers, you can still adopt the ‘realist’ position I propose.   
3. Failed alternatives. Here is one approach I’ve tried to deal with problem a. Turn an equation, say y 
= g(z1,…zn), into a proposition not by adding universal quantifiers across all systems but rather with 
something like: ‘For any situation s, so long as all the features that fix the value of y in s are 
represented by z1,…zn, then y = g(z1,…zn) in s.’ This allows but does not require that the zs always pick 
up all the determinants of y. But it undersells the force of the equations. There are many cases 
where the equations play a significant role in building a model even where the zs do not represent 
all the determinants of y, or at least we don’t recognise how to use them to do so.  
This brings us to b. since many of the corrections may be needed because there are factors at work 
that we can’t represent in the theory. I have never – till now – come up with a reasonable ‘realist’ 
approach for dealing with b. 
For c. we can call on powers (or as I say, ‘capacities’9). Hume rejected powers because he could find 
no difference between the presence of a feature and its acting, as there should be if the feature 
were a power.10 The analytic sciences seem to populate the world with powers in this sense. There’s 
the presence of a charge, the Coulomb force it exerts on another charge when the two are 
appropriately arranged, and the total force the second charge experiences. At first I called these 
intermediates, the ‘influence’ or ‘contribution’ the power makes to the actual outcome. For 
example, ‘When q1’s Coulomb power is activated, it produces a contribution Fc = ϵ0q1q2/r
2 to the 
total force a charge q2 located r away from it experiences’. But this is misleading. It sounds as if the 
contribution is there in the same way as the outcome, like the stones in a wall. I don’t find that 
plausible even with forces, which do not add but combine vectrorially – let alone where more 
complicated rules of combination apply.11 John Pemberton and I tried calling these ‘exercisings’12 
since it seems powers are always active in contributing to outcomes. But this seems a cheat. What 
                                                          
8
 Faraday cages block electric fields. 
9
 See Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Reproduced in Oxford Scholarship on Line (2003).  
10
 Or its occurrence was in some other way associated with the presence of a power. 
11
 For instance, resistances (say R1 and R2) from different resistors combine differently if the resistors are 
arranged in series (Rtotal = R1 + R2) or in parallel (Rtotal = R1 R2/ (R1 + R2), and their effect on the current in a 
circuit with one battery is given by Ohm’s law using Rtotal. But with two batteries and 3 resistors or simple 
bridge circuits, let alone really complex circuits, we end up using a toolkit of methods to calculate the total 
effect on current, including various reduction schemes and sets of simultaneous equations. For further 
examples, including the role of the Coulomb law in determining ground state carbon energy levels, which I 
discuss in section 5, see Essay 3 in How the Laws of Physics Lie. 
12
 Cartwright, N. (2015). ‘How Could Laws Make Things Happen?’ In N. Spurway (Eds.), Laws of Nature, Laws of 
God? Proceedings of the Science and Religion Forum Conference 2014. Cambridge Scholars. For an earlier piece 
where ‘contribution’ and ‘exercise’ are both used see Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2013). ‘Aristotelian 
Powers: Without Them, What Would Modern Science Do?’ In J. Greco, and R. Gross (Eds.), Powers and 
Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. New York: Routledge.  
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does it mean to say ‘When the Coulomb power acts, it exercises ϵ0q1q2/r
2-ly’? And what can we 
possibly say about a resistor labelled with ‘resistance = 5 Ohms’? ‘It resists 5-Ohmly’?  
Both Pemberton and I now think all this is a mistake. When powers exercise they always exercise in 
some actual situation. Yet we think of our representations of them as situation free, as if they could 
act ‘nowhere’ or in a world where they occur ‘all alone’. It is easy to get sucked into this by 
concentrating on forces, which we may suppose we imagine operating in an ‘idealisation’ of a real 
situation: one where the components are present –  say both masses –  located physically with 
respect to each other, but no other forces obtain. So we say, as I myself have, ‘In this situation we 
see what gravity does on its own’. Then we suppose that in other situations, gravity is ‘trying to do 
the same thing’. But what is the cash value of this?  It just means that the actual force that occurs 
when gravity acts is whatever other force is there vector-added to what gravity produces ‘on its 
own’. Even this much sense cannot be made for other powers. In economics we talk of the powers 
of the supply mechanism and of the demand mechanism to affect price and we represent these 
powers in separate equations. But it makes no sense to imagine either operating ‘on its own’. And I 
don’t even know how to start to think about resistances in no circuit whatsoever.  
We are also misled into positing contributions by thinking of powers as dispositions that need a 
conditional analysis: ‘X is water-soluble iff if x is placed in water in the right way, x dissolves’. 
Similarly, as above: ‘Q1 has the Coulomb power iff when activated in the right way, it produces a 
contribution Fc = ϵ0q1q2/r
2 to the total force a charge q2 located r away from it experiences’.  But 
powers, so I argue, are part of our basic ontology. We don’t need contributions because powers 
don’t need conditional analysis. They don’t need analysis at all; they just are – lots and lots of them. 
Looking just to physics, there’s gravity, the Coulomb power, friction, the power to resist the flow of 
electricity, the power to turn on an axis, and so on and so on and so on. There’s much to say about 
powers as a category and there’s much to say about specific powers. Naturally we pick out different 
powers by what they do in various circumstances, or what they look like, or how they affect 
measuring instruments. But that’s how we identify which is which. None of that constitutes an 
analysis, which is fine because things don’t need analyses in order to be real.  
So I propose to drop talk of ‘contributions’, ‘exercisings’, ‘intermediates’. Of course when a power 
acts, it does something. But there is not some one thing it does. Rather, we have a way of 
representing the power, a representation we know how to use to calculate what happens when that 
power acts in various arrangements. So I have not solved problem c. because I have no candidate 
proposition we might regard as true to associate with the principles for components parts in 
theories where the analytic method is employed. Still it advances my overall project. But only given a 
new story about how Nature decides, occasion by occasion, what happens. 
4. How Nature builds what happens. Here’s an old story. There are true universal laws from which 
what happens in every situation can de deduced.  Since the laws are true, what they say happens is 
what does happen. So Nature looks at the laws and produces what they say. I can’t use this story. I 
have no laws, just a large battery of different powers that we represent in our theories and for which 
we have theoretical practices that allow us to calculate what happens when these powers act in 
various arrangements. What image of Nature makes sense of the successes and failures of these 
practices? 
I propose that Nature does it just the way we do it, piecemeal and with no firmer rules than we 
employ. Why suppose that Nature employs a tight system rather than a loose one like ours? This is 
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by far the most straightforward account of how our practices succeed: They replicate Nature’s own 
practices.13  
5. Back to realism. Here’s how I see theory working when it works well:  We develop sets of 
theoretical practices and representations that together allow us (using our theoretical 
representations as representations, not as claims) to generate situation-specific truths. These truths 
are true because Nature generates the situation-specific facts in the same way that we do. Or rather, 
this works for us because we have cottoned on to how Nature does it. As I noted in section 1. 
Generally our theoretic representations – the theory’s principles and equations – are invisible in 
these situation-specific truths, though many of our theoretic concepts may appear in them. 
Sometimes, though, even the representation itself, much as it appears in our theories, appears in 
these claims.  
For the pleasure of coming full circle and also to find a simple illustration, I’ll consider the case of the 
five energy levels of the ground state of a carbon atom that I discussed in How the Laws of Physics 
Lie (Essay 3).14  Textbook treatments first derive three levels using only the Coulomb potential, then 
divide the 3P state into three by adding terms to correct for spin effects. In How the Laws of Physics 
Lie I made a few attempts at formulating some true factual claims with the quantum Coulomb 
potential for the two 2p carbon electrons as cause and the three levels as effect but with no success. 
I finally proposed a counterfactual: ‘[T]he Coulomb potential, if it were the only potential at work, 
would produce the three levels’, [p 69] 15 which, I suppose, if it is to be true at all must be said of 
some particular carbon atom, say Carby. But what makes this counterfactual true? The answer is 
surely, Schroedinger’s equation and the quantum version of Coulomb’s principle. But how, given 
that these cannot be rendered as true propositions from which the counterfactual can be derived?  
The counterfactual is true and it depends on Schroedinger’s equation and the quantum version of 
Coulomb’s principle. But that’s not because these are true laws and Nature makes happen what true 
laws say. It is rather because this is the way Nature operates. She uses both Coulomb’s principle and 
Schroedinger’s equation, but as representations, just as we do. She uses them to determine what 
energy levels Carby will display. We have ample evidence that this is how she operates. So we also 
have good warrant for the claim that if Carby’s spin effects were missing, she would see to it that 
Carby displayed the three levels in question.   
There are also a great many true factual claims. Supposing Carby has been prepared for a finely 
tuned experiment to measure energy levels (as in footnote 14), Schroedinger’s equation in almost its 
pure form (i.e. with few ‘correction factors’), with both the Coulomb term and a spin-orbit term in it, 
will be true of Carby. This too is true for Carby: the Coulomb potential is literally an additive part of 
the potential that determines Carby’s ground state energy levels. Of course these two claims would 
                                                          
13
 This leaves space for genuine indeterminacy: What’s open in Nature is much like what is open so far as we 
can calculate with a really good theory. I welcome this since it is how I experience the world. But it is not a 
necessary consequence of the view. (For further discussion, see N. Cartwright and P. Merlussi, forthcoming, 
‘Are the Laws of Nature Consistent with Continegncy?’ In W. Ott and L. Patton (Eds.), The Laws of Nature, 
Oxford University Press.) 
14
 Here I depart from my own standards in aid of providing a simple illustration. This is not any real carbon 
atom but itself a tool we use to construct models of real carbon atoms. Nevertheless, let’s pretend that it is 
some real carbon atom, perhaps one whose fine-structure intervals are being measured by laser magnetic 
resonance, as for instance in the experiment by Saykally and Evenson [in the Astrophysical Journal, 238:I21o7-
Lll 1, 1980 June 1, ‘Direct Measurement of Fine Structure in the Ground State of 
Atomic Carbon by Laser Magnetic Resonance’, Richard J. Saykally and Kenneth M. Evenson] 
15
 p 69 
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be available given my solution to problem a. But we should want far more than a. provides for both 
the Schroedinger equation and Coulomb’s principle since we use them for a vast number of cases 
where correction factors must be included.  
6. Conclusion. I suggest that Nature does not derive what is to happen from some set of true claims. 
She does it just as we do, from representations and practices like ours. This surely should be counted  
a kind of realism. Certainly it renders the principles of successful theory true in the sense of 
pragmatic truth that Hasok Chang defends.16 But I think this image of Nature permits a more robust 
realism about our theoretical representations. First, many of their terms refer.  Second, Nature uses 
them for fixing what happens in the very form in which they appear in our theories, just as we use 
them in the process of predicting those happenings. Third, they are associated with a great many 
situation-specific truths in which their form appears almost unchanged. Finally, returning to my 
prudent empiricism, this is an image of Nature that the successes of our theories and their practices 
supports, unlike one in which Nature employs claims we can’t formulate and methods we have no 
use for. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Cf. Chang’s piece in this volume. 
